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A peIson is generally liable in tort when an act
is done i) intentionally (for example trespass) or
ii) negligently, In some cases, however, a person may
be liable when he acts neither intentionally or
negligently. In this instances the law has imposed a
strict limit, a person's activities, and if this
limit is exceeded the defendant is strictly or absolutely
liable. The most Common Law example of such liability
is known as the rule is Rylands v. Fletcher. The rule
was propounded by Blackburn J. which was later approved
by the House of Lords and now regarded as detlnitive
"We think that the true rule of law is,
that a person who for his own purposes
brings on his lands and collects and
keeps there anything likely to do mischief
if it escape, must keep it in at his peril,
and if he does not do so, is prima facie
answerable for all the damage which is the
natural consequence of its escape. He
can excuse himself by showing that the
escape was owing to the plaintiff's
default; or perhaps that the escape was
the conequence of a vis major, or the
Act of God. Eu t as no thing of this sort
exists here, it is unnecessary to inquire
what excuse would be sufficient.
The rule in Rylands v Fletcher will thus be applied
where there had been a "non-natural uses of land"
in that something has been introduced on the
defendant's land which was not there naturally.
This "something" might be water, gas, electricity,
plants which have been artificially sown, or indeed
anything which is naturally on land will of course,
not make the owner of the land liable to pay damages
except where the e~cape was done so negligence.
The "escape" referred to in the rule must be the
escape of the unnatural thing brought from the
defendant's land to the plaintiff's land.
Meaning that there must be an escape of the thing
which inflicts the injury from a place over which
the defendant has occupation or control to a
place which is outside his occupation or control.
The requirement that proof of escape is necessary
means that only a person who suffers damage by
reason of the dangerous thing crossing the boundry
of the land from which it comes can succeed in an
action. But it should be noted that the rule is
confined to claims between neighbourinr, occupiers
of land.
T~e Blackburn J. indicated only two possible
defences, namely, the plaintiff own default and
Act of God. Since the rule was first expounded
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